Showing posts with label Netherlands. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Netherlands. Show all posts

22 January, 2010

Unfortunate Victors: The Doomed Battle for ABN AMRO


Photo: Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis and Banco Santander acquired ABN AMRO Holding for Eur 70.0-billion (USD $101.0-billion) in November 2007, marking it the largest banking acquisition in history up to that point. Ironically, barely one year following their massive acquisition, the Royal Bank of Scotland and Fortis went de facto bankrupt during the credit crisis and were nationalized by Britain (RBS) and Belgium and Luxembourg (Fortis). Meanwhile, the Dutch state bought ABN AMRO's Dutch operations from the bankrupt Fortis, returning the bank to Dutch control.


Children's Money, Adult's Battle

To the Dutch business world, 2007 was a dramatic year that saw the sale of ABN AMRO Holding NV. For several years, ABN AMRO’s management had been questioned for their mediocre management and poor profitability. Then in February 2007, British-based investment fund TCI (The Children’s Investment), holder of about 2% of ABN AMRO’s shares, openly criticized the bank’s management strategy and demanded the bank be sold or split up.

While publicly defending its long-term strategy during March, ABN AMRO held secret talks with British bank Barclays plc about a potential merger. On 2007-03-20, ABN AMRO and Barclays announced that they were in exclusive discussion about a potential combination. Speculation that a bidding war from other European and American banks would erupt lifted ABN AMRO's share prices from under Eur 30 to Eur 35 within days.

While the exclusive discussion between ABN AMRO and Barclays was still in progress, a banking consortium formed by the Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS), Belgium’s Fortis and Spain's Banco Santander on 2007-04-13 sent a letter to ABN AMRO’s board expressing their wish to acquire the Dutch bank. The banking consortium’s plans involved carving up ABN AMRO’s extensive global operations. RBS would take over ABN AMRO’s U.S. subsidiary LaSalle Bank, as well as ABN AMRO’s retail, commercial and investment banking businesses outside of Brazil, Italy and the Netherlands. RBS already had a sizable U.S. subsidiary named Citizens Financial. By acquiring Chicago-based LaSalle Bank, RBS could achieve greater synergy and efficiency in the U.S.

Meanwhile, Fortis planned to take over ABN AMRO’s home market in the Netherlands, as well as its global private banking and asset management divisions. Lastly, Banco Santander, which already operated extensively in Latin America, would take over ABN AMRO’s Brazilian operations Banco ABN AMRO Real, and expand into the high-growth Italian market by acquiring ABN AMRO’s Banca Antonveneta. With much more overlap in their existing markets, the tri-bank consortium could achieve much more cost savings and afford a higher price for ABN AMRO than Barclays.

The Dutch Central Bank, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), favouring a merger of equals between Barclays and ABN AMRO over the consortium’s break-up proposal, warned on 2007-04-18 of the risks and complications in “the preparation… the execution and implementation” of the [consortium’s] proposal. His comments, however, were immediately criticized by the European Commission that nationalist protectionism must not be used to discourage cross-border consolidation within the EU.

Barclays-ABN AMRO's Poison Pill

After a month of exclusive talks, Barclays and ABN AMRO jointly-announced on 2007-04-23 that they had agreed to an all-stock deal that valued ABN AMRO at Eur 67.0-billion (GBP 45.4-billion, USD $91.0-billion), making it the biggest banking merger ever. At the same time, ABN AMRO also announced that it had agreed to sell its U.S. operations LaSalle Bank (officially known as ABN AMRO North America Holding Co.) to Bank of America for USD $21.0-billion (Eur 15.46-billion) in cash. ABN AMRO’s surprise announcement to pre-emptively sell LaSalle Bank was clearly a “poison-pill” move to fend off the breakup proposal from RBS, Fortis and Santander. Without LaSalle Bank, the division most sought after by RBS, it was believed that consortium might disband itself.

Under the Barclays-ABN AMRO merger proposal, the new bank would retain the name Barclays plc, and have its head office in Amsterdam. Existing Barclays shareholders would end up owning 52% of the new bank, while the remaining 48% would be owned by the former ABN AMRO shareholders. About 12,800 jobs would be cut from the combined operations. Consolidation cost savings would amount to Eur 3.5-billion annually.

Furious Consortium Counter-offers

Understandably, RBS, Fortis and Santander were furious about ABN AMRO’s agreement to sell LaSalle Bank to Bank of America for USD $21.0-billion. British investment fund TCI and Dutch investor rights group VEB both demanded that the terms of the LaSalle Bank sale be made public, and a shareholders’ meeting be called to vote on the sale.

Barely two days following the Barclays offer, RBS, Fortis and Santander made an unsolicited, informal offer of Eur 72.2-billion (USD $98.5-billion) for ABN AMRO, triggering a dramatic takeover battle. The consortium’s offer consisted of 70% in cash and 30% in stock. However, the offer was conditional on ABN AMRO rescinding its agreement to sell LaSalle Bank. Analysts generally favoured the consortium’s offer, as it was higher than the one proposed by Barclays, and had a high cash component as opposed to Barclays’ all-stock offer, whose value had fallen to Eur 65.0-billion (USD $88.2-billion) due to a drop in Barclays’ share prices. When ABN AMRO’s management refused to let its shareholders vote on the sale of LaSalle Bank, shareholder rights group VEB launched a lawsuit against the Dutch bank.

Throughout April and May 2007, the market wildly speculated that HSBC, BNP Paribas, BBVA and JPMorgan Chase could also bid for ABN AMRO. There were also rumours that Société Générale and UniCredit were in merger talks with each other.

ABN AMRO’s uncertain future prompted some clients to pull their savings from the bank and others to express concerns. ABN AMRO’s employees and labour unions accused the shareholders of selling out one of Netherlands’ most important businesses, and urged the shareholders to put the future of Dutch jobs and the Dutch economy ahead of greed.

Meanwhile, Bank of America, eager to acquire LaSalle Bank from ABN AMRO, signalled that it would sue ABN AMRO should the LaSalle Bank sale agreement be rescinded, potentially triggering a lengthy and nasty legal battle across the Atlantic.

While all the parties waited for the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s ruling on the VEB lawsuit, ABN AMRO openly questioned how the consortium could come up with more than Eur 50.0-billion in cash to pay for the offer.

The Trans-Atlantic Lawsuits

On 2007-05-03, the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ruled that ABN AMRO’s sale of LaSalle Bank to Bank of America was illegal, and that ABN AMRO must obtain shareholders’ approval before the sale could proceed. Within 24 hours of the Dutch court’s ruling, Bank of America filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in Manhattan demanding ABN AMRO to go ahead with the sale.

At the same time, Dutch finance minister Wouter Wos also waded into the takeover drama by urging the RBS-Fortis-Santander consortium to clarify on their financing and breakup implementation plans.

Not backing down from the legal setback, Barclays and ABN AMRO filed an appeal on 2007-05-15 to the Dutch Supreme Court over the ruling that froze the sale of LaSalle Bank to Bank of America. Then two weeks later, RBS, Fortis and Santander officially presented their hostile Eur 71.1-billion offer for ABN AMRO.

The takeover battle went through a month of relative calm until 2007-06-25, when the most senior advisor to the Dutch Supreme Court, Attorney General Levinius Timmerman concluded that ABN AMRO’s sale of LaSalle Bank to Bank of America was legal, and should not be blocked. The Attorney General’s legal opinions, while not binding, have historically been highly regarded by the Supreme Court.

Barclays-ABN AMRO: 1 Consortium: 0

On 2007-07-13, as expected, the Dutch Supreme Court cleared ABN’s sale of LaSalle Bank to Bank of America. Analysts began to wonder if the setback would cause RBS to pull out of the consortium. By now, however, a further drop in Barclays’ share prices meant that its offer has fallen in value to Eur 63.7-billion (USD $87.6-billion).

Despite the failure to secure LaSalle Bank, the RBS-Fortis-Santander consortium not only pressed on with the offer, but on 2007-07-16 raised the cash component of their offer from 70% to 93.5%, with the rest payable in Royal Bank of Scotland shares. This meant that the consortium now needed to come up with Eur 65.7-billion (USD $90.4-billion) in cash to buy ABN AMRO.

Barclays Gets Hot Money from Asia

Barclays, refusing to back down from the battle, also worked behind the scene to look for ways to raise its offer. Exactly one week after the consortium raised their cash portion of the offer, Barclays raised GBP 2.44-billion (Eur 3.6-billion, USD $4.97-billion) in cash by issuing a 3.1% stake to China Development Bank and a 2.0% stake to Singapore’s sovereign fund Temasek Holdings. Barclays would use the proceeds to buy back its own shares to support its share price. Should the bid for ABN AMRO succeed, China Development Bank had committed to invest another GBP 3.64-billion worth of Barclays shares, whereas Temasek had committed to invest another GBP 499-million worth of Barclays shares.

Armed with this freshly-injected GBP 2.44-billion cash, Barclays raised its offer for ABN AMRO to Eur 67.5-billion (USD $93.1-billion) and added a cash component to it: the new offer was 37% in cash and 63% in Barclays’ shares. Barclays’ new offer was still 5% below that from the tri-bank consortium, but the bank was betting that its share buyback programme would prompt investors to bid up its share prices. It was also hoping that ABN AMRO’s shareholders might favour the friendly merger deal over the uncertainties surrounding the consortium’s offer.
However, Barclays’ new offer failed to ignite investor enthusiasm and the value of its offer continued to linger around Eur 66.0-billion rather than catch up to the consortium’s Eur 72.0-billion.

Consortium Seeks Eur 65.7-Billion, in Cash

In late July, there were doubts over whether Fortis, the smallest member in the consortium, could raise the Eur 24.0-billion from investors to finance its share of the ABN AMRO purchase. For much of late July and August, ABN AMRO shares traded between Barclays’ offer price and the consortium’s offer price, suggesting uncertainties over the outcome of the battle. However, Fortis, RBS (Eur 22-billion) and Santander (Eur 19.8-billion) all successfully raised the cash required to pay for ABN AMRO.

Barclays, meanwhile, was understood to be taking a wait-and-see stance, as it was convinced that the Dutch central bank and the EU anti-trust authorities would place tough conditions on Fortis’ plan to take over ABN AMRO’s Dutch operations.

Tremors from the U.S.

The takeover battle for ABN AMRO took another unexpected twist in August, when the credit crisis suddenly caused banks around the world to tighten lending activities. The formerly red-hot U.S. housing market, which had been in a slump since late 2006, began to cause massive loan losses in the global banking sector throughout the summer of 2007. Corporate bond prices slumped and trading of higher-risk mortgage loans, often packaged and re-sold to investors as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), came to an abrupt halt when mortgage default rates soared. As many companies around the world had invested their short-term cash in these CDOs, the seize-up of CDO market caused a sudden shortage of cash. The resulting liquidity crisis led stock markets around the world to tumble. At one point, there were fears that both Barclays and the consortium would withdraw its offer for ABN AMRO due to their high exposure to the alternative investment market.

During the first wave of the credit market crunch in late-August, the value of Barclays’ mostly-stock offer fell sharply to Eur 58.4-billion (USD $79.3-billion, GBP 40.0-billion), essentially wiping out all the gain made by the cash injection from China Development Bank and Temasek. Despite a significant fall in RBS’ and Fortis’ share prices also, the value of the RBS-Fortis-Santander offer remained relatively steady at around Eur 70.6-billion (USD $96.5-billion) due to its high cash element. Nevertheless, several of RBS’ institutional shareholders in September 2007 were believed to have urged the bank to activate the “material adverse event” clause to reduce or even cancel the offer for ABN AMRO.

Cash is King. Barclays Loses the Battle But Wins Eur 200-million

Meanwhile, Barclays’ hope that Fortis would face anti-trust challenges in the Netherlands was dashed on 2007-10-03, when the European Commission cleared RBS-Fortis-Santander’s acquisition of ABN AMRO. One day after that, only 0.28% of the outstanding ABN shares were tendered to Barclays and the British bank conceded defeat. In accordance with the friendly merger agreement, ABN AMRO paid Barclays a Eur 200-million breakup fee. Meanwhile, the RBS-Fortis-Santander consortium received more than 86% of ABN AMRO’s shares and made its offer unconditional. The consortium's higher and almost all-cash offer clearly won over the hearts of ABN AMRO’s shareholders at uncertain times. At closing, the consortium’s offer was worth about Eur 70.0-billion (USD $101.0-billion).

Two of the Three Victors Became Big Losers

Even though RBS, Fortis and Banco Santander appeared to be the victors, against all odds, in the takeover battle for ABN AMRO, it soon became apparent that their acquisition could not have been executed at a worse time.

Throughout 2008 and 2009, the global real estate bubble burst and the CDO market collapsed. Recklessly careless lending by banks and carefree borrowing from consumers since 2000 together contributed to a massive housing and credit bubble in the United States, Great Britain, Spain, Ireland, Iceland and Eastern Europe. A huge amount of these consumer loans was re-packaged into “innovative” investment products that were off-balance-sheet, meaning that the loans were not subject to regulatory capital requirements.

When the bubble burst in 2007 and 2008, the impact was so severe that many of the world’s largest financial institutions including Citigroup, Bank of America, Wachovia, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, HBOS, Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis and UBS certainly would have gone bankrupt were it not a concerted effort by governments around the world to inject much-needed capital into the banks, and to unconditionally guarantee their loan losses and customer deposits.
Shockingly, less than one year following their triumphant purchase of ABN AMRO, both the Royal Bank of Scotland and Fortis were de facto bankrupt in September 2008. At this point the Dutch state decided to buy ABN AMRO's Dutch operations from the bankrupt Fortis, which ironically, returned ABN AMRO to Dutch control. The Royal Bank of Scotland only survived because the British government nationalized the bank by injecting billions of pounds of new capital, as well as insuring hundreds of billions of sour loans against losses. Similarly, Fortis was nationalized by the Belgian and Luxembourg states. Fortis' Belgian operations were then taken over by BNP Paribas. Both RBS’ and Fortis’ shareholders lost almost 100% of their investment.

The Shrewd Santander

Banco Santander, on the other hand, came out of the ABN AMRO drama as a true and respected winner. In fact, just when the whole ABN AMRO deal was being closed, Santander surprised the market by selling Banca Antonveneta, ABN AMRO's Italian division that it had just acquired days earlier, to Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena for Eur 9.0-billion (USD $13.21-billion) in cash. This meant that Santander only paid about Eur 9.8-billion for Banco ABN AMRO Real of Brazil, which was considered to be a bargain.

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10 December, 2009

Netherlands Bank Mergers & Acquisitions (ABN AMRO Holding)



Photo: Banks are perhaps some of biggest spenders in marketing. Shown here is a pair of Team ABN AMRO cuff-links in the around-the-world Volvo Ocean Race 2005-2006.


In late 2007, ABN AMRO Holding was taken over by a consortium formed by the Royal Bank of Scotland, Belgium's Fortis S.A./NV and Spain's Banco Santander. Subsequently, both the Royal Bank of Scotland and Fortis became de facto insolvent. The Dutch operations of Fortis and ABN AMRO were nationalized by the Dutch state in October 2008.


ABN AMRO Holding NV

Algemene Bank Nederland (ABN)
Thanks to their strategic locations on the coast of the North Sea, Amsterdam and Rotterdam have functioned as major trading, transportation and financial centres since the 1600s. To further strengthen their role in trade and finance, King William I of the Netherlands signed a Royal Decree in 1824 establishing the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM, or Netherlands Trading Society) in Amsterdam. Gradually, the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij turned its attention to trade financing. 


By the late 1920s, NHM had established offices across the world, including in multiple posts in present-day Indonesia, and in Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, Hong Kong, China, Myanmar (Burma), India, Suriname and Saudi Arabia. In October 1964, it merged with De Twentsche Bank to become the Algemene Bank Nederland (ABN), which is Dutch for "General Bank Netherlands".

Interestingly, some of NHM's former offices grew into rather sizeable operations. For example, NHM's Jeddah office (founded in 1926) became a Saudi Arabian bank. In 1977, to comply with a new legislation requiring all foreign banks to cede majority control of their local subsidiaries to Saudi Arabian interests, ABN Saudi Arabia (successor to the NHM) was  renamed Saudi Hollandi Bank, with ABN AMRO retaining a 40% stake until ABN AMRO itself was taken over and broken up by RBS, Banco Santander and Fortis.


Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank (AMRO Bank)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam have been rivals in winning trade and finance since the medieval times. In 1863, the business leaders in Rotterdam set up the Rotterdamsche Bank, which was modelled after British colonial banks like the Mercantile Bank and the Chartered Bank. Initially, Rotterdamsche Bank specialized in providing loans to companies operating in the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia, then a Dutch colony). Subsequently, the bank decided to expand its operations at home in the Dutch market. Early in the 20th century, Rotterdamsche Bank changed its name to Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging, or Robaver for short. In 1964, Robaver merged with Amsterdamsche Bank, which was founded in 1871 to focus on the Dutch and German money markets. The new bank was known as the Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank, or AMRO Bank for short.

Recent transaction(s):

  • In 1990, ABN and AMRO Bank announced a friendly merger to create ABN AMRO Holding NV.
  • In 1996, ABN AMRO bought Standard Federal Bancorp for USD $1.9-billion. Standard Federal was based in Troy, Michigan.
  • In 1998, ABN AMRO bought Brazil's 4th largest bank Banco Real for USD $2.1-billion to form Banco ABN AMRO Real.
  • In 2001, ABN AMRO's U.S. division LaSalle Bank bought Michigan National Bank from National Australia for USD $2.75-billion.
  • In 2003, ABN AMRO’s Brazilian division Banco ABN AMRO Real bought Banco Sudameris from Italy's Banca Intesa for Eur 648-million.
  • In 2005, ABN AMRO offered to buy the 87.3% of Italy's Banca Antonveneta that it did not already own for Eur 6.30-billion (USD $8.10-billion). Following ABN AMRO's announcement, Banca Popolare Italiana (formerly Banca Popolare di Lodi) launched its own but lower offer for Banca Antonveneta. Subsequently, it was discovered that Banca d'Italia's (Italy's central bank) governor Antonio Fazio had secretly pushed for a "made-in-Italy" merger between Popolare Italiana and Antonveneta over the higher offer from ABN AMRO. The scandal resulted in Mr. Fazio’s resignation and the suspension of Popolare Italiana's senior executives. In late 2005, ABN AMRO was given the final approval to take over Banca Antonveneta in a deal that valued the Italian bank at Eur 8.12-billion (USD $9.80-billion). The takeover of Antonveneta was the first time a major Italian bank had been acquired by a foreign bank.
  • In 2007, ABN bought 93.4% of Pakistan's Prime Bank for PKR 13.8-billion (Eur 172-million). ABN also launched a tender offer for the remaining 6.6% shares in the open market. Prime Bank operated 69 branches in 25 Pakistani cities. The bank had Eur 654-million in assets and Eur 515-million in deposits.
  • In April 2007, ABN AMRO and Britain’s Barclays plc agreed to a friendly merger. ABN AMRO had been under shareholder pressure for its under-performing profitability for several years. Barclays’ initial all-stock offer valued ABN at Eur 67.0-billion. Meanwhile, the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Belgium’s Fortis and Spain’s Banco Santander were also preparing for a competing bid to buy out and carve up ABN AMRO Holding amongst themselves. Hoping to thwart the hostile offer from RBS-Fortis-Santander, ABN AMRO agreed to sell ABN AMRO North America Holding Co. (LaSalle Bank Corp.) to Bank of America for USD $21-billion in cash. RBS had wanted to combine its U.S. division Citizens Financial with ABN AMRO's LaSalle Bank. In pre-emptively selling LaSalle Bank to Bank of America, ABN AMRO was hoping to make itself unattractive to the Scottish-Belgian-Spanish consortium and foil the "break up ABN AMRO" proposal.
  • In 2007, amidst the battle for ABN AMRO Holding, the Dutch bank agreed to accept TWD 6.90-billion (USD $209-million) from the Taiwan government to takeover the operations of the bankrupt Taitung Business Bank. Taitung Business Bank had been under state administration due to its overwhelming non-performing loan portfolio. Under the agreement, the Taiwan government would pay TWD $6.90-billion to ABN to take over Taitung Business Bank's assets, liabilities and 32 branches. ABN AMRO already operated five branches in Taiwan.
  • In late 2007, ABN AMRO Holding lost its autonomy when its shareholders accepted a Eur 70.0-billion (USD $101.1-billion) buyout from the Royal Bank of Scotland (with a 38.3% stake), Fortis (33.8%) and Banco Santander (27.9%). The tri-bank consortium would break up ABN AMRO's various global operations amongst themselves in two years. Click here for a detailed timeline of the Battle for the Control of ABN AMRO.
  • During the second half of 2008, the RBS and Fortis were caught up in the Global Banking Meltdown. As financial institutions failed around the world from massive loan losses incurred from the U.S. real estate collapse, banks became unwilling to lend to each other, resulting in a sharp rise in the Libor rates (London Inter-bank Borrowing Rates). Banks that had over-extended themselves, including RBS and Fortis, became insolvent as their funding source dried up.
  • On 2008-09-29, the Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg governments jointly rescued Fortis by providing Eur 11.2-billion (USD $16.2-billion) of emergency funding. The Belgian state agreed to buy 49% of Fortis' Belgian banking unit, Fortis Bank S.A./NV for Eur 4.7-billion (USD $6.79-billion); the Dutch state agreed to buy 49% of the Dutch bank unit, Fortis Bank Nederland Holding, for Eur 4.0-billion (USD $5.78-billion); whereas Luxembourg agreed to buy Eur 2.5-billion (USD $3.61-billion) of bonds convertible into 49% of the local unit Fortis Banque Luxembourg. Fortis was also expected to auction off the ABN AMRO businesses that it had just paid Eur 24-billion for in 2007. However, the most likely buyer, ING Groep, had announced that it was not interested in bidding for ABN AMRO’s global operations.
  • However, the massive cash injection from Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg failed to quell widespread fears over Fortis’ survival, and clients were said to be transferring their deposits to other banks. On Friday 2008-10-03, the Dutch government made a surprise announcement that it had agreed to nationalize the entire Dutch operations of Fortis S.A./NV for Eur 16.8-billion (USD $23.2-billion). The units bought by the Dutch government included all of Fortis Bank Nederland (Holding) NV, Fortis’ interests in ABN AMRO, insurer Fortis Verzekeringen Nederland NV, and Fortis Corporate Insurance NV. The Dutch government’s deal to buy all of Fortis’ Dutch banking and insurance operations replaced the deal to buy 49% of Fortis Bank Nederland for Eur 4.0-billion (USD $5.78-billion) announced just a week earlier.
  • Even though Fortis’s Dutch operations were not believed to be badly in distress, the Belgian-based parent Fortis S.A./NV had been teetering on the brink of collapse. The Dutch government said in a statement that the nationalization of Fortis Nederland and ABN AMRO was needed to stabilize the panicky Dutch monetary system. The deal gave the Dutch government the entire control of the bancassurance operations, which would make it much easier to sell than had the government only acquired a minority stake. The deal also allowed Belgian-based Fortis to receive badly-needed capital.
  • The Dutch government planned to merge ABN AMRO and Fortis Bank Nederland into a new entity and privatize it in 2011 or later.
  • In November 2015, the Dutch government floated 20% of ABN AMRO on the Amsterdam stock exchange and raised EUR 3.34-billion, valuing the bank at EUR 16.7-billion. The Dutch state expected to take several years to unload all of ABN AMRO back to private shareholders.
  • During the summer of 2016, Swedish bank Nordea approached the Dutch government to acquire the majority-state-owned ABN AMRO, but the Dutch government was not interested in selling its stake. At the time, ABN AMRO had a market value of over EUR 17.0-billion.
  • In December 2016, ABN AMRO sold its private-banking business in Asia and the Middle East to Liechtenstein-based LGT Group. Terms of the sale were not disclosed. The unit managed USD $20-billion in Singapore, Hong Kong and Dubai. LGT is owned by Princely House of Liechtenstein and the purchase would increase its assets under management to more than USD $40-billion in Asia, and $160-billion globally.
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06 October, 2009

Netherlands Bank Mergers & Acquisitions (ING Groep)


Photo: A Toronto commuter train carrying an ING Direct Canada advertisement.


ING Groep NV

ING can trace its history back to 1743 with the creation of Kooger Doodenbos, an organization that offered insurance policies for tradesmen, professionals, and widows and orphans against fire loss. Over the next 100 years, insurers like Kooger Doodenbos and others amalgamated and evolved into two large insurance companies, namely De Nederlanden van 1845 (created in 1845) and De Nationale Levensverzekeringbank (created in 1863). These two organizations combined in 1963 to form the Nationale-Nederlanden. The insurer expanded aggressively throughout the 1970s and 1980s by acquiring other insurers in the Netherlands and in North America.

The banking side of ING goes back to the 1881 founding of Rijkspostspaarbank (literally, the State Post Savings Bank), which was part of the Dutch postal service. In 1986, the Rijkspostspaarbank merged with De Postcheque- en Girodienst (established in 1918) to form the new Postbank. Then in 1989, Postbank and Nederlandsche Middenstandsbank (established in 1927) merged to form the NMB Postbank Group.

In 1990, deregulation in the Dutch financial services industry allowed for the first time mergers between insurers and banks. In 1991, insurance company Nationale-Nederlanden and banking company NMB Postbank merged to form the Internationale Nederlanden Groep. Almost right from the beginning, the financial market and the media abbreviated the name to I-N-G, which was subsequently adopted officially by the company itself.

In 1997, the first ING Direct bank (on-line banking) was launched in Canada, which was hugely popular with its self-serve, zero-fee, high interest rate savings account product. ING Groep soon expanded the ING Direct concept to Australia and Spain in 1999, France and the United States in 2000, Germany and Italy in 2001, Great Britain in 2003, and Austria in 2004.

Recent transaction(s):

  • In 1995, ING Groep bought Barings Bank for GBP 1. Barings, one of the most revered names in the merchant and investment banking world, went bankrupt when rogue trader Nick Leeson's speculative trades in Singapore led to a USD $1.4-billion loss. Unable to meet its margin obligations, Barings went into receivership. ING Groep, anxious to expand its investment banking and asset management business, paid a nominal GBP 1 to acquire Barings, and agreed to assume its debt and financial obligations to settle all outstanding transactions.
  • In 1997, ING bought the remaining 80% of Banque Bruxelles Lambert S.A. for USD $4.68-billion. ING had acquired an initial 20% stake of the Belgian bank in the early 1990s.
  • In 1998, ING acquired 49% of German on-line bank Allegemeine Deutsche Direktbank (DiBa).
  • In 2000, ING bought a 39.7% stake in a Savia subsidiary that held 71.6% of Seguros Comercial America (SCA) for USD $555-million. SCA was Mexico's largest insurer. As part of the agreement, ING had the right to increase its stake in the Savia unit to 49% after one year, and to acquire a controlling stake after three years.
  • In 2000, ING bought ReliaStar Financial Corp. of United States for USD $5.1-billion and assumed ReliaStar's USD $1.2-billion debt.
  • Later in 2000, ING bought the financial services and international divisions of Aetna Inc. for USD $5.0-billion and assumed those divisions' USD $2.7-billion debt.
  • In 2000, ING bought an additional 49% of Mexican pension fund manager Afore Bital for USD $196-million. ING had already owned 49% of Afore Bital before this latest acquisition.
  • In 2001, ING acquired an additional 19.7% of Poland's Bank Śląski (Slaski) for Eur 133-million. ING had already owned 55% of Bank Slaski prior to the tender offer. The Polish bank had 330 branches in the country.
  • In 2001, ING acquired an additional 45% interest in Mexican insurer Seguros Comercial America (SCA) for USD $791-million. After the latest purchase, ING’s stake in SCA was raised to 87%. ING subsequently made an offer to buy out other minority shareholders for USD $180-million, raising its stake in Seguros Comercial America to 99.91%.
  • In 2002, ING acquired an additional 24% stake in India's Vysya Bank for Eur 73-million from Indian conglomerate GMR Group. Following the purchase, ING would own 44% of ING Vysya Bank. ING first acquired a 20% stake in Vysya Bank through its Banque Bruxelles Lambert subsidiary.
  • In 2002, ING bougt an additional 21% in Allgemeine Deutsche Direktbank (DiBa) from a number of trade unions. ING would own 70% of DiBa after the acquisition.
  • In 2003, ING's 70%-owned German direct bank DiBa (Allegemeine Deutsche Direktbank) bought Germany's No. 2 direct bank Entrium for Eur 300-million. Entrium has 965,000 clients and assets of Eur 7.1-billion.
  • In 2004, ING sold its German subsidiary ING BHF-Bank to Sal. Oppenheim for Eur 600-million.
  • In 2005, ING acquired a 19.9% stake in Bank of Beijing, one of the more than 100 city-commercial banks in China, for Eur 166-million (USD $232-million, CNY 1.78-billion). Bank of Beijing had more than 8.2-million individual account holders and 124 braches in Beijing and Tianjin. In 2007, following the IPO of Bank of Beijing, ING's stake was diluted to 16.07%.
  • In 2007, ING Groep bought Turkey's Oyak Bank for Eur 2.0-billion (USD $2.67-billion) from the country’s armed forces pension fund. Oyak operated 360 branches across Turkey. Oyak Bank was created in 1984 by Ordu Yardislasma Kurunu, Turkey's armed forces retirement fund.
  • In 2007, ING bought Banco Santander's pension fund management business in Latin America for Eur 960-million (USD $1.3-billion). ING gained over Eur 13.8-billion (USD $19.9-billion) in assets under management in Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay.
  • In 2007, ING sold ING Insurance Belgium NV, its Belgian broker and employee benefits insurance unit, for Eur 750-million.
  • In 2007, ING acquired a 30% stake in Thailand's TMB Bank PCL for Eur 460-million (USD $674-million). TMB Bank had more than 5 million customers and 472 branches in Thailand.
  • In 2008, ING acquired Turkey’s private pension fund Oyak Emeklilik for Eur 110-million. Oyak Emeklilik had 150,000 clients.
  • In 2008, ING launched a public offer to acquire Germany’s largest independent residential mortgage distributor Interhyp AG for Eur 416-million. Interhyp distributed mortgage products from over 50 banks and had 38,000 closed mortgages.
  • In 2008, ING sold ING Seguros S.A. de C.V's non-life businesses (property & casualty and auto insurance, plus its Health and Life insurance lines) to France's AXA S.A. for Eur 1.0-billion (USD $1.5-billion).
  • In 2008, ING sold its reinsurance unit Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep NV (NRG) to Columbia Insurance Company for Eur 272-million. ING’s divestment of NRG was part of its plan to refocus on its core businesses in banking, investments, life insurance, and retirement services.
  • In 2008, ING bought CitiStreet LLC, a retirement benefit plan servicing business based in the U.S., for Eur 578-million (USD $895-million). CitiStreet provided record-keeping and administration services for retirement benefit plans and had been jointly-owned by Citigroup and State Street Corp.
  • On 2008-10-19, the Netherlands injected Eur 10-billion (USD $13.4-billion) to ING Groep. The government's purchase of non-voting subordinated bond came with no equity stake. The Dutch government would be entitled to annual coupon rate of up to 8.5% based on a complex formula. ING could either convert the bond into ordinary shares and pay back Eur 10-billion to the government after three years, or buy back the bonds from the Netherlands at 150% of the issue price at any time.
  • In 2008, ING sold its Taiwanese life insurance business ING Antai Life Insurance to Fubon Financial Holding Co. for Eur 447-million (USD $600-million, TWD $19.3-billion). ING first entered the Taiwanese life insurance market in 1987 but its returns had been unsatisfactory. ING intended to re-deploy the capital to its more profitable operations. ING Antai Life had 2.2-million clients and managed TWD $610-billion (Eur 14.1-billion) of assets. Fubon already had 6.5-million clients in Taiwan and the purchase would propel it to become the No. 4 insurer from the No. 6.
  • In February 2009, ING divested a majority of its Canadian insurance subsidiary ING Canada Inc. for CAD $2.16-billion (Eur 1.37-billion, USD $1.75-billion). ING had held about 70% of the ING Canada with the remaining 30% being held by public shareholders. Following the sale, ING Canada renamed itself Intact Insurance. ING Bank of Canada, the Canadian on-line banking unit of ING Groep was not part of the transaction and remained wholly-owned by ING Groep.
  • In September 2009, the EU’s review on the Dutch government’s state guarantees for ING ruled that the aid amounted to unfair subsidies. The Dutch government had agreed to buy Eur 22.2-billion (USD $32.2-billion) of ING’s U.S. “alternate-A” mortgage loans at a 10% discount to the par value of the portfolio. Similar loans were selling at a much bigger discount in the open market. The EU ruling could force ING to return several billion Euros to the Dutch government.
  • Also in 2009, ING sold its 51% stake in ING Australia and ING New Zealand to its partner ANZ Banking for Eur 1.1-billion (AUD $1.76-billion, USD $1.5-billion). The units sold were in the life insurance and wealth-management business. ING Groep and ANZ merged their Australian and New Zealand life insurance and wealth-management units back in 2002, with ING owning 51% and ANZ owning 49% of the combined units. Not included in the sale were ING’s other businesses in Australia: ING Direct, ING Investment Management, ING Wholesale Banking and ING Real Estate.
  • In October 2009, ING sold its Swiss wealth management business to Julius Baer Group Ltd. (Julius Bär) for CHF 520-million (Eur 343-million, USD $506-million). The unit managed CHF 15.15-billion (Eur 10-billion) of assets.
  • Also in October 2009, ING sold its Asian private banking business to Singapore's Overseas-Chinese Banking Corp. (OCBC) for SGD $2.04-billion (Eur 981-million, USD $1.46-billion). The business sold managed Eur 11-billion of assets in the Far East.
  • (See update in 2012) In late October 2009, ING reached a deal with the European Commission to garner approval for the state aid it received from the Dutch government. Under the deal, ING would (1) dispose of its entire insurance operations either by sales or by initial public offerings by 2013, (2) pay an additional Eur 1.3-billion (USD $1.95-billion) to the Dutch government for the Eur 22.2-billion of state guarantees, (3) raise Eur 7.5-billion (USD $11.25-billion) from a rights issue, and (4) dispose of its ING Direct USA on-line bank. The agreement essentially ended ING's bancassurance business model.
  • In December 2009, ING sold its 50% interest in Pacific Antai Insurance to China Construction Bank. Pacific Antai was a 50-50 joint-venture between ING and China Pacific Insurance.
  • In February 2011, ING sold its real estate investment management business to U.S. commercial real estate brokerage CB Richard Ellis Group Inc. for USD $940-million. The unit sold had Eur 65-billion in assets and operated in 20 countries.
  • In June 2011, ING Groep sold its American on-line bank ING Direct USA to Capital One Financial for USD $9.0-billion (Eur 6.3-billion). ING would receive USD $6.2-billion in cash and USD $2.8-billion in Capital One shares. Following the sale, ING would hold a 9.9% stake in the U.S. bank. ING Direct USA had over 7-million clients and USD $82-billion of deposits.
  • In August 2012, ING Groep sold its ING Bank of Canada to the Bank of Nova Scotia (Scotiabank) for EUR 2.52-billion (CAD $3.13-billion, USD $3.09-billion).  The sale gave ING Groep much needed capital to meet new, higher capital requirement following the global banking crisis in 2008. ING Bank of Canada had CAD $30-billion in deposits, $40-billion in assets, and 1.8 million clients.
  • In October 2012, ING sold its Malaysian insurance operations ING Insurance Bhd to Hong Kong-based AIA Group for USD $1.73-billion (HKD$ 13.4-billion, Eur 1.33-billion). ING Malaysia had 1.6 million clients. AIA was spun out of beleaguered U.S. insurer AIG in 2010.
  • Also in October 2012, ING sold its ING Direct UK to Barclays plc. ING Direct UK had 1.5-million clients, GBP 10.9-billion in deposits and GBP 5.6-billion of mortgage loans. Terms were not disclosed.
  • Later in October 2012, ING sold its Hong Kong, Macau and Thailand insurance operations to Hong Kong-based Pacific Century Group for USD $2.14-billion (Eur 1.64-billion, HKD $16.6-billion). Pacific Century is controlled by Richard Li, son of Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing.  ING's Hong Kong and Macau insurance operations had 270,000 clients and the Thai operations had 300,000 clients.
  • In November 2012, ING won more time from EU to divest its insurance operations as required to accept state aid from the Dutch government.  Under the new deal, ING has until the end of 2015 to divest at least 50% of its European insurance operations, and until 2018 for the rest.  ING must dispose of at least 50% of its Asian insurance operations by 2013, and the rest by 2016.  As for the American insurance operations, 25% must be disposed by 2013, at least half by 2014, and the rest by 2016.  ING also agreed to pay Eur 4.5-billion back to the Dutch government by May 2015 for the Eur 3.0-billion it received in state aid.
  • In May 2013, ING Groep raised USD $1.46-billion (Eur 1.11-billion) from floating its U.S. life insurance, annuities and retirement products division.  The IPO offering represented a 29% stake in the business, now renamed Voya Financial.  ING Groep will gradually sell off the remaining 71% of Voya Financial by 2016.
  • In August 2019, ING's 25%-owned Thai bank TMB announced that it would merge with local rival Thanachart Bank (also known as "TBank"). Following the merger, ING's stake in the combined TMB-Thanachart Bank would be around 21% according to some reports. Earlier news reports suggested the merger was worth THB 140-billion (USD $4.47-billion).

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